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Introduction
The phrase "standard of review," when used in domestic law, nor-
mally refers to the aggressiveness with which an appellate court will review
a lower court's ruling.1 A low, or deferential, standard of review implies
that a higher court will reverse a lower court's ruling only if the lower court
commits a serious error. 2 A high, or stringent, standard of review implies
that a higher court will reverse a lower court's decision if the appellate
court finds there to have been any error at all. 3
t Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Programs, Berkeley Law School. J.D.
Harvard Law School, Ph.D. (Economics) Harvard University. Thanks to Joost Pauwelyn
and the participants at the Berger/Cornell International Law Journal Symposium on
Process and Procedure in WTO Dispute Settlement.
1. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REV.
469, 470 (1988) (identifying six distinct standards of review in domestic litigation).
2. See id. at 471, 475-81 (identifying six distinct standards of review in domestic
litigation and the level of deference each accords).
3. Id. The same terminology is also used, in similar fashion, to describe judicial
review of legislative or administrative actions. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that a court shall apply a deferen-
tial standard of review to an agency's reasonable construction of a statute that is silent
or ambiguous regarding the issue); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 365-67 (1986) (discussing the principles of law gov-
erning judicial standards of review of agency action).
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The World Trade Organization (WTO), however, defines "standard of
review" somewhat differently. 4 Here, the term refers to the review of
national decisions or policies by WTO panels or the Appellate Body (AB). 5
The distinction between deferential and stringent review remains, but the
decision under review is the one made by one of the litigants to the case
rather than by a lower court.6 This distinction is important to understand-
ing both the existing jurisprudence of the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) and
the normative implications of its approach.
In general, the role of trial and appellate courts is based on their rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses. The standard of review also reflects the
abilities of each court. In domestic litigation, appellate courts are valued
because they bring consistency to lawmaking, because they are thought to
be (on average) more qualified jurists, and because they can focus more
closely on questions of law.7 By contrast, trial courts see much more of
the case and are thus better positioned than appellate courts to determine
issues of fact.8
The WTO should, and to a significant extent does, determine the stan-
dard of review applied, to national decisions using principles similar to
those in domestic litigation. It should also take into consideration the rela-
tive capabilities of national authorities and WTO panels. In particular,
while WTO panels have the merit of neutrality when reviewing a case,
which normally counsels in favor of allowing them to exercise more strin-
gent review, their weakness is similar to that of most reviewing courts: they
are less knowledgeable about the facts of the case. 9 This means that-as
compared to a national government-the panel is less familiar with the
events that took place, is poorly positioned to evaluate the preferences and
attitudes of individuals, and is less skilled at evaluating political, cultural,
and other factors relevant to a decision.
4. See Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 635, 637-39 (2003) (defining standard of review in the context of the WTO).
5. Id. at 637. The standard of review can also refer to the review of panel decisions
by the Appellate Body, but that is a different issue that is not addressed in this article.
See, e.g,, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court"-
Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 619 (2002).
6. See Oesch, supra note 4, at 637-38.
7. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) ("Courts of
appeals ... are structurally suited to the collaborative juridical process that promotes
decisional accuracy. With the record having been constructed below and settled for
purposes of the appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their primary attention to
legal issues.").
8. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988) (stating that due to
pretrial activities, a lower court may have insights the record may not convey, and that
the only way an appellate court can get full knowledge of the full factual record is to
review the entire record).
9. See Appellate Body Report, European Community- Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), 115, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R Uan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter EC- Hormones AB Report] (stating that the standard of review "must reflect
the balance established in [the SPS] Agreement between the jurisdictional competences
conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by
the Members for themselves").
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This article considers how the applicable standard of review should be
determined based on the relative strengths of the WTO adjudicatory
organs and domestic governments. It explains when review at the WTO
should be de novo, when there should be an intermediate review, and
when the panel or AB should largely defer to the decisions of member
states. In the process, it compares these normative claims to existing WTO
practice.
I. The Importance of the Standard of Review
WTO agreements impose a broad set of legal obligations on member
states with which these states are expected to comply. To judge compli-
ance, WTO panels and the AB must determine how to review states'
actions. For example, is a measure supported by sufficient scientific evi-
dence as required by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)? 10 Has there been an injury sufficiently
serious to justify a safeguard measure? Are two goods "like products"? Is a
given measure necessary to protect public morals?
One possible strategy for evaluating state compliance would be to have
a WTO panel review all such questions de novo, substituting its own judg-
ment for that of the relevant member state. This method would have the
merit of putting the key judgment in a neutral party's hands, rather than in
the hands of a member state with an interest in the outcome. It would also,
however, have a host of disadvantages. For instance, such a rule would
move a tremendous amount of decision-making authority to the panel and
the AB. These organs would have to determine, for example, the appropri-
ate level of risk that citizens within a member state should have to face
before they regulate the importation of a potentially dangerous product.
Such an approach would greatly undermine the authority of states to deter-
mine their own policies, including in areas long thought to be under
domestic control such as health policy, environmental regulation, and
labor standards.
Once it is agreed that a de novo approach should not be applied in all
circumstances, the standard of review question becomes critical. For
example, if it is alleged that a member state implemented a safeguard in
violation of the Agreement on Safeguards, it is necessary to first determine
whether the member state imported a product "under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that pro-
duces like or directly competitive products."" How should a WTO panel
or the AB judge the adequacy of the defendant's investigation?
10. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
-11. Agreement on Safeguards art. 2(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uru-
guay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
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The defendant state is certain to know more about its own economy
and the impact of imports than does a panel or the AB. Moreover, the state
has more time and greater resources than WTO tribunals. The state is,
therefore, better positioned than WTO judicial organs to determine
whether the importation of a product caused injury to the state. Con-
versely, the defendant state may face domestic political pressures to violate
the agreement. This reality raises the possibility that the defendant state
will misrepresent its conclusions with respect to injury in order to achieve
its own domestic objectives. How one balances the need for objectivity
against the informational advantage member states possess has a critical
impact on the extent to which WTO obligations constrain states.
II. What We Know About Standard of Review
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes 12 (DSU) establishes the standard of review in WTO dis-
putes. Article 11 of the DSU states that "a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements."'13 This standard of review applies generally to all
WTO disputes unless a more specific rule exists. 14 On its face, the lan-
guage of Article 11 does not clarify whether a panel or the AB should
engage in de novo review or the extent to which they should defer to the
determinations of national authorities. 15
Specific provisions in the various agreements could have further clari-
fied the appropriate standard of review. With the exception of Article 17.6
of the Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement, however, the member states
declined to include that level of detail. 16 They did not specify a standard
of review in the SCM Agreement, 17 the SPS Agreement, 18 the Safeguards
Agreement, 19 or any of the other WTO agreements. 20
12. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
13. Id. art. 11.
14. For example, a specific standard of review applies in anti-dumping disputes. See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter AD Agreement].
15. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO
Law, 7J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 495 (2004) (stating that "the standard of 'objective assess-
ment' is couched in rather broad terms that do little to provide substantive guidance on
the nature and intensity of the review which panels should apply to national measures").
16. MATT-HIAS OESCH, STANt)ARDs oF REViEW IN WTO DisputE RESOLUTION 7 (2003);
see AD Agreement art. 17.6.
17. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex LA, 1867 U.N.T.S.
14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
18. See generally SPS Agreement.
19. See generally Safeguards Agreement.
20. OESCH, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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The question of the appropriate standard of review is closely related to
the question of what authority and power the WTO has and what power
remains with member states. Member states, for example, retain authority
over domestic regulatory policy, but when that policy impacts trade, they
may need to turn to Article XX of the GATT 2 1 to defend their actions.2 2 If
they do so, a panel or the AB must determine the degree of deference to
give to the member when assessing whether a measure satisfies the require-
ments of Article XX. 23 If, for example, Article XX(d) is at issue, the panel
must rule on whether the measure is "necessary" to secure compliance with
relevant laws or regulations. 2 4 Granting greater deference to the state's
decisions is equal to increasing its substantive power to impact trade.
As already mentioned, the AD Agreement, in contrast to all other WTO
Agreements, includes fairly explicit instructions regarding the standard of
review:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether
their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establish-
ment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective,
even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evalua-
tion shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement
admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the
authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon
one of those permissible interpretations. 25
The standard applied here is clearly deferential to both the factual and
legal determinations made by the anti-dumping authorities of states.
Under (i), the panel is charged only with determining if the establishment
of the facts was proper and if the evaluation was unbiased. 2 6 If so, the
panel must accept the conclusions that the state reached. 27 Under (ii), the
panel must defer to the legal interpretation of the state authorities as long
as that interpretation is reasonable. 28
21. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
22. Bradly J. Condon, GATT Article XX and Proximity-of-Interest: Determining the
Subject Matter of Paragraphs B and G, 9 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 137, 138, 142
(2004).
23. See OESCH, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that the issue of the appropriate stan-
dard of review to apply arises whenever panels and the AB must interpret and apply
domestic law); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1996)
(observing that GATT dispute settlement procedures have confronted questions of
national sovereignty when determining the degree to which an international body
should question a national government's decision).
24. GATT art. XX(d).
25. AD Agreement art. 17.6.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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For any other dispute, however, they key language is in Article 11 of
the DSU.29 One interpretation of that provision, however, suggests that
even Article 11 does not instruct panels or the AB on the standard of review
at all. In the Chile-Agricultural Products case, 30 the AB stated that a panel
fails in its obligations under Article 11 if it makes a finding on a matter not
before it "because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of
response." 31 This denial of a fair right of response is a failure "to accord to
[the member] the due process rights to which it is entitled under the
DSU."3 2 The suggestion is that DSU Article 11 is concerned with provid-
ing litigating states certain due process rights rather than with establishing
the appropriate standard of review. 33 Because any standard of review-
including de novo review, complete deference, and anything in between-is
consistent with a due process requirement, this interpretation would imply
that even the modest guidance that might otherwise be found in DSU Arti-
cle 11 is not relevant.
The reasoning from Chile-Agricultural Products is broadly consistent
with the conclusions of the AB in United States- Hot Rolled Steel in which
the AB addressed the relationship between DSU Article 11 and AD Agree-
ment Article 17.6.3 4 Notice that if DSU Article 11 is taken to prescribe a
particular level of review-if, for example, the words "an objective assess-
ment of the matter before it"35 are taken to require a de novo review of facts
or law-then there is an apparent tension between DSU Article 11 and AD
Agreement Article 17.6.36 At least with respect to an AD dispute,3 7 one
would have to determine which of the two standards applied. In the Hot
Rolled Steel case, however, the AB stated that there was "no 'conflict'
between Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 11 of the
DSU."'38 In the judgment of the AB, then, the deferential standard estab-
lished by AD Article 17.6 is consistent with the requirement of DSU Article
11.39 This decision implies that the requirement of objectivity in DSU Arti-
cle 11 is not to be read as demanding a certain standard of review. Instead,
29. See DSU art. 11; OESCH, supra note 16, at 98.
30. Appellate Body Report, Chile- Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating
to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R (Sept. 23, 2002).
31. Id. 7 176.
32. Id.
33. Id.; OESCH, supra note 16, at 83.
34. Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan, 55, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Hot-
Rolled Steel AB Report].
35. DSU art. 11.
36. If these two provisions were in tension, the AD Agreement rule would govern.
See id. art. 1.2, app. 2 (indicating that to the extent there is a difference between the rules
and procedures of the DSU and the rules and procedures set forth in the covered agree-
ments identified in Appendix 2, the rules specified in the covered agreements will
prevail).
37. If bilateral attempts between two members to resolve a dispute under the AD
Agreement fail, a member may refer the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body provided
for in the AD Agreement. See AD Agreement art. 17.4.
38. Hot-Rolled Steel AB Report, supra note 34, 55.
39. See id.
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it merely requires that there be no bias applied to the adopted standard. 40
Not all AB decisions, however, share this perspective on DSU Article
11. The AB took a different view in EC- Hormones,41 concluding that DSU
Article 11 does indeed prescribe the standard of review that panels are to
adopt. The AB declared that "[s]o far as fact-finding by panels is con-
cerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11
of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor
,total deference', but rather the 'objective assessment of the facts." 42 The
suggestion here is that DSU Article 11 does indeed prescribe a particular
standard of review and that both a highly deferential standard and a de
novo standard would be in conflict with this provision. Even if the inter-
pretation in EC- Hormones is correct, that case does not extend beyond
ruling out the most extreme forms of review. In this sense the differences
between EC- Hormones, Hot-Rolled Steel, and Chile- Agricultural Products,
though conceptually significant, have little impact in practice. All three
decisions leave open the question of the appropriate standard of review,
and all three decisions are consistent with an interpretation that DSU Arti-
cle 11 provides little or no guidance on the question.
One claim about Article 11 that is likely to be widely accepted is that a
"one size fits all" take on the standard of review is incomplete. 43 Article 11
requires that panels and the AB make an "objective assessment."44 Objec-
tivity is not only desirable but is also, as I argue later, the defining feature
that makes WTO dispute settlement valuable. Objectivity, however, is not
sufficient to resolve disputes. The WTO must establish the degree of defer-
ence that members' decisions should receive. In contrast to the objectivity
requirement spelled out in DSU Article 11, there is no single "correct" rule
as to degree of deference. In some areas, states should be entitled to
greater deference, while in other areas more stringent review is necessary if
WTO obligations are to be respected.
Existing WTO jurisprudence has implicitly acknowledged that the
standard of review must vary depending on the agreement at issue and the
matter being decided.45 Indeed, even within a single agreement different
40. See id. (stating that "it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i) should require any-
thing other than that panels make an objective 'assessment ..."').
41. See EC- Hormones AB Report, supra note 9.
42. Id. 1 117.
43. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 496 (stating that the scope and
intensity of the panel's objective assessment is not the same for every issue, nor in every
dispute, and suggesting that the "one size fits all" approach is therefore not practical); see
also CATHERINE BUTTON, THE POWER TO PROTECT: TRADE, HEALTH AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE
WTO 186 (2004) (stating that instead of looking for a non-existent ready-made standard
of review, the AB should "balance between regulatory autonomy and international
supervision ... in order to support a revised standard of review").
44. DSU art. 11.
45. See, e.g., EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, ' 115 ("The standard of review
appropriately applicable in proceedings under the SPS Agreement, of course, must reflect
the balance established in that Agreement between the jurisdictional competences con-
ceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained by the
Members for themselves.").
Cornell International Law Journal
standards of review are applied depending on the issue in question. This is
clear, for example, if one considers some of the obligations within the SPS
Agreement. On the one hand, a de novo review of the health threat posed
in an SPS case would represent a dramatic and stunning intrusion into core
areas of domestic authority.4 6 Not surprisingly, the AB has avoided that
approach. On the other hand, a stringent review of the requirement that
states select the least trade-restrictive measure available is an important
check on protectionist impulses and falls squarely within the Dispute Set-
tlement Body's (DSB) mandate to resolve disputes about trade matters. 47
The lesson from all of this is that both common sense and existing
doctrine suggest that DSU Article 11 does not, cannot, and should not pre-
scribe a single standard of review for all cases. It follows that the standard
of review must vary depending on the context, and the AB must identify
the circumstances in which panels should adopt more or less stringent
standards. This variation in the applicable standard of review includes, but
is not limited to, distinctions between the standard of review applicable to
factual determinations as compared to legal ones. 4 8 For questions that are
purely matters of WTO law, panels engage in de novo review of the judg-
ments made by national authorities. 4 9 This approach is required by the
DSB's exclusive role in interpreting the WTO agreements.5 0 Granting def-
erence to national authorities would either grant individual states the
power to interpret the WTO agreements in a way that would constrain
other states (if that interpretation was accepted for future cases) or would
create a system in which different states would be able to interpret obliga-
tions to suit themselves, creating obligations that vary from state to state.
Alternatively, for questions of fact, a more deferential review is appropriate,
as discussed later in this article.
111. Bias vs. Expertise
At least three things are clear from the prior discussion about the stan-
dard of review as applied by the AB to date. First, the AB has, in practice,
significant flexibility in determining the appropriate standard of review.
Second, the AB has no choice but to determine the standard of review that
it will apply and the standard that the panels must apply. Third, the stan-
dard of review applied can vary from issue to issue.
46. BUTTON, supra note 43, at 165 (observing that it makes a great "difference to the
scope of Members' autonomy whether the panel assesses the existence of a proper scien-
tific justification de novo, or whether it exercises ... deference").
47. See Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2004).
48. See EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 1 112-118 (distinguishing the stan-
dard of review applicable to factual as opposed to legal disputes).
49. Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 498.
50. The DSB has exclusive authority to interpret agreements outside of a formal
interpretation by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council. See Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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The next question is how the AB should determine the appropriate
standard of review. Without guidance from the relevant legal texts, the AB
has little choice but to do what judicial organs throughout the world do in
such situations: base its decisions on relevant policy considerations. To do
so, of course, requires that those policy concerns be identified and
evaluated.
To start such an analysis it is helpful to ask whether the AB (or a
panel) is in a better position than a state to reach a determination on an
issue. Or, put differently, will better outcomes be achieved if member
states can interpret a given legal rule unilaterally, or is it better to have a
panel or the AB second-guess a state's interpretation? Answering this ques-
tion definitively requires a measure of performance-some way to evaluate
outcomes as better or worse. Within the context of evaluating the standard
of review, however, no such measure is evident, nor would constructing
such a measure be easy. Because the WTO agreements are the product of
negotiations among states, 5 1 it is difficult to speak of an "objective" of
those agreements beyond what is included in their texts. It is incorrect to
say that there is a goal, for example, of more liberalized trade. The drafters
certainly could have provided language that reduced the barriers to trade
far beyond the current standards, but they did not do so. Furthermore, the
WTO agreements do not charge the WTO judicial organs with the task of
achieving objectives that are independent of their language.5 2
Though the evaluative problems discussed earlier pose difficulties in
determining the preferred approach in each instance, it is possible to make
relative assessments. That is, it is possible to make comparisons across
different types of issues or questions and provide a ranking-ordering the
issues from those that should receive the greatest deference to those that
should receive the least. We can identify factors that should push toward
more or less deferential review. In doing so, we can then describe the vari-
ables that should influence the decision and provide guidance on the
appropriate standard a judicial body should apply.
There is little disagreement that interesting standard of review issues
involve a balancing of the authority of panels and the AB against the sover-
eign rights of states to set their own policy.5 3 No one would disagree, for
example, with the claim that sovereign states are entitled to establish their
own standards with respect to environmental, labor, and health policies.
When the impact of these policies on trade becomes serious enough, how-
51. INFO. & MEDIA RELATIONS Div., WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
9-10 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that the WTO was created by negotiations and that every-
thing it does is the result of negotiations).
52. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitu-
tional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INTL L. 247, 250-51 (2004) (stating that to
help ensure the WTO dispute settlement system would not shift the members' rights and
responsibilities the DSU says that the AB cannot add or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions covered in the agreements).
53. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 494-96.
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ever, WTO obligations may constrain the policy options of the state.54
In the first instance, this balancing of interests is, and should be, done
through the substantive rules of the WTO. The relevant rules permit mea-
sures that do not nullify or impair the benefits that other member states
enjoy.55 For example, a state is free to tax economic activity as it wishes,
but the rules constrain the state's ability to do so in a way that discrimi-
nates against foreign products. In the second instance, interpretive ques-
tions about the meaning of the words exist in the WTO agreements. It is
only after these questions of interpretation are addressed that the standard-
of-review issue comes into play. In particular, to what extent should a
panel or the AB review the compliance of measures enacted by member
states with WTO obligations? Moreover, to what extent should a panel or
the AB evaluate local priorities? In what circumstances should a panel or
the AB apply its own judgment to the question of how alternative policies
will work within a member state?
A. Different States, Different Policies
To speak coherently about the appropriate standard of review, we
must first have a sense of the trade-off between leaving greater discretion in
the hands of states and having panels and the AB review state activities
with greater care. What are the features of panels and the AB that make
them more appropriate places in which to locate decisions about state con-
duct? It seems that the key feature of these judicial organs is their neutral-
ity. Unlike member states, these judicial organs have no reason to favor the
goals or ambitions of one state over those of another.5 6
Member states, conversely, are familiar with the concerns and priori-
ties of their own citizens and have a better understanding of domestic mar-
kets and institutions. In addition, they are better positioned to carry out all
manner of information gathering and investigation than are panelists or AB
members. States can devote greater resources to this sort of activity, will
normally have more time to gather and evaluate information, and can more
easily make use of relevant experts.
The dilemma inherent in selecting a standard of review is familiar. On
the one hand, it is important that trading rules be applied to all states in a
consistent and evenhanded way. Doing so encourages trade and discour-
ages the adoption of costly protectionist measures. On the other hand, the
AB and panels must respect domestic preferences and priorities.
To illustrate the problem, consider the facts from the EC- Hormones
54. See Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The
WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KA.N. L. REv. 823,
827 (2002).
55. See DSU art. 3.3; see also GATT art. XXIII.
56. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 1,
25-26 (2005) (noting the impartiality of the WTO judicial body). There are a range of
concerns one might have about the impartiality of judges or the objectives they seek to
pursue. At the WTO, one might also be concerned that panels and the AB are them-
selves political players within the WTO system and cannot avoid having their decisions
affected by the identity of the parties.
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case. 5 7 At issue in that case were European Community (EC) measures
excluding meat treated with certain hormones from its market.5 8 The
United States (among others) adopted a different policy position that per-
mitted such meat to be sold in the United States. 59 One can easily imagine
this difference in policies arising even in the absence of trade; that is, these
two jurisdictions could reasonably adopt different policies, even if trade
issues motivated neither policy. 60 Furthermore, as long as domestic con-
cerns unrelated to trade motivate these policies, and as long as trade
impacts are minimized, there are good reasons to permit these different
policies to remain in place.
6 1
Assuming that trade concerns play no role in this sort of policy deci-
sion, it is difficult to provide a compelling argument for why any interna-
tional tribunal, including one at the WTO, should have second-guessed the
policy priorities of Europe in this case. In the absence of a protectionist
motive, these different policy preferences reflect differences in risk toler-
ance or, perhaps, in the interpretation of scientific evidence. Such differ-
ences should be accepted and, indeed, encouraged. Individuals may not
only have varying preferences regarding, for example, their willingness to
accept risk, but they may also be differently situated, causing them to view
trade-offs differently. 62 For example, all else equal, a poor country will
likely tolerate larger health risks in exchange for economic gains than will a
rich country. 63 Furthermore, heterogeneity in rules spurs healthy debate
about policies and values and encourages innovation and experimentation,
all of which add value to the global community.64 Most importantly,
because domestic governments are better able to craft policies that suit
their citizens' interests than is an international tribunal, the decision about
the relevant rules should be left with those governments.
65
National governments have an additional advantage over the judicial
organs of the WTO-they are better at collecting and analyzing data. For
example, they are better positioned to determine how best to gather infor-
57. See generally EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9. This example is only
intended as an illustration. Other real or hypothetical cases face the same issues.
58. Id. 9 2.
59. See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Between Intensive Care and the Crematorium: Using the Stan-
dard of Review to Restore Balance to the WTO, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 465, 507-08
(2007).
60. Guzman, supra note 47, at 11, 15-17 (noting that two countries may employ
different policies based on domestic values and attitudes, and that the WTO system does
not acknowledge legitimate reasons for divergent state preferences).
61. Id. at 11-15 (describing the reasons why allowing competing domestic policies
is preferable).
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. (noting that a poor country may accept a greater risk for less expensive food,
while a wealthy country would not).
64. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in Interna-
tional Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 792-93 (1999) (arguing that development
on national scales allows for mini-laboratories to provide diverse options, while having
one international system of development would eliminate innovation).
65. One could add issues of legitimacy to the list of reasons why domestic govern-
ments are better situated to make domestic policy. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 14.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 42
mation, what evidence can be obtained, how to interpret it, and what meth-
odologies to use.66 They are better equipped both because they are more
familiar with local conditions and because they have greater capacity and
more time to undertake the evaluation of information.67
B. One World, One Policy
Despite the advantage that domestic governments have in evaluating
local concerns and enacting measures to address those concerns, not all
decisions-not even all decisions that implicate traditionally domestic con-
cerns-should be left to domestic authorities alone. States have entered
into the WTO system because they value a single set of rules governing
trade. 68 They understand that without such rules, certain incentives can
tempt states to adopt policies that needlessly undermine the trading system
and that prove costly to all states.69 In the DSU, member states made it
clear that they believe the WTO system is stronger and more valuable with
a system of binding dispute resolution. 70
Put more bluntly, the dispute settlement system discourages states
from adopting measures for protectionist purposes. 71 The leaders of demo-
cratic states answer to their own citizens and thus seek to advance state
objectives rather than those of the international trading system. 72 There-
fore, although states have collectively agreed to abide by the WTO agree-
ments, panels and the AB help to prevent them from ignoring their trade
commitments.
The neutrality of the dispute settlement system is the key feature that
allows it to opine on states' behavior. Because the system does not have a
bias in favor of any litigant, it has credibility when resolving disputes. 73 Its
neutrality also implies that its interpretation and application of the lan-
guage contained in the WTO agreements is more reliable than interpreta-
tions by litigants acting out of self-interest. 74
This neutrality is the closest we can come to an objective metric of
performance for alternative standards of review. Whatever standard is
applied, it is important that it promote actions that conform closely to the
66. See id. at 23 (stating that WTO dispute regulation organs "lack the resources to
carry out their own investigation in anything more than a cursory way").
67. See id. at 21-24.
68. See generally WTO Agreement.
69. See, e.g., GATT art. XXIII.
70. DSU art. 3.2.
71. Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Require-
ments: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 353 (2002) (stating the reciprocal com-
mitments resulting from the WTO negotiations reduce or eliminate traditional methods
of protectionism).
72. Guzman, supra note 47, at 15.
73. See, e.g., DSU art. 17.3 (providing that the AB will be comprised of persons unaf-
filiated with any government who do not have a conflict of interest and that the member-
ship should be broadly representative of the membership of the WTO); see also Guzman,
supra note 47, at 15-16.
74. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 47, at 14-17 (giving an example of how the WTO's
neutrality can lead to a better application and interpretation of the WTO agreements).
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requirements of the WTO agreements. The obvious problem is that we
often cannot discern what the text of the agreements requires without hav-
ing a panel and the AB interpret the agreements' text. Nevertheless, a tribu-
nal's unbiased ruling is, all else equal, preferred to a biased one.
Notice that the emphasis on bias is slightly different from the empha-
sis on uniformity and consistency in application of WTO law that exists in
some writing on standard of review. 75 Though there is reason to want uni-
formity and consistency in some instances, these desiderata yield neither a
policy-based rationale for a particular standard of review 76 nor an account
of existing practices.77
Returning to the EC- Hormones78 example, if we assume that Europe
had protectionist reasons for excluding hormone-treated beef, then the
WTO was justified in reviewing this protectionist policy. 7 9 If the EC can
benefit its farmers by excluding hormone-treated beef, for instance, it will
be biased toward that policy and may be tempted to find a non-protection-
ist justification for the policy, such as an alleged concern for the health
consequences of the beef.
IV. Balancing Neutrality and Sovereignty
Selecting an appropriate standard of review involves a balancing of the
advantages of neutrality against those of state sovereignty. There is no
"one size fits all" way to carry out this balance. 80 Even within an individ-
ual WTO agreement the balance will depend on the particular issues at
stake.81 Indeed the interpretation of the substantive law at issue may
influence the appropriate standard of review applied in the context of a
particular rule.
Consider, for example, the meaning of the term "like products" in
GATT Article 111:2.82 Existing AB jurisprudence provides that a determina-
tion of whether two products are "like" involves a consideration of many
factors, including the end uses of the product, product characteristics, con-
sumer tastes and habits, the nature and quality of the product, and the
75. See, e.g., OESCH, supra note 16, at 30-31.
76. For example, what areas should have uniformity? Why those areas?
77. For example, why require uniformity in the facts necessary to claim injury, but
not require uniformity in weighing the merits of scientific evidence?
78. EC- Hormones AB Report, supra note 9.
79. See Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 2329, 2329-40 (2000) (stating that SPS
provisions apply even to nondiscriminatory regulations that would not violate GATT
provisions and thereby implying that even if there is a possibility that a state's trade
regulation may be discriminatory, the WTO would review it as it did in the beef hor-
mones dispute).
80. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 496 (suggesting that a "one size
fits all" approach would not work well).
81. See Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative
Perspective, 42 Tex. INT'L L.. 371, 395-96 (2007).
82. GATT art. 111:2. The term "like products" appears in various other places in the
WTO agreements. See, e.g., AD Agreement art. 3.1. For present purposes, however, it is
sufficient to focus on this one occurrence.
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tariff classification. 83 Applying this test inevitably requires detailed knowl-
edge about the domestic market of the relevant member state-knowledge
that may be difficult for a panel to quantify or verify.8 4 Therefore, a state
may have an advantage over a panel in evaluating whether two products are
"like," which warrants at least some deference to the state's judgment
regarding the relevant domestic factors.85 If, however, the AB chooses to
rely on a straightforward economic measure-such as the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two products-to determine whether two products
are "like," a panel could easily verify the information needed to reach a
conclusion. Because the elasticity of substitution can be calculated using
familiar techniques and standard economic data, the information is as
readily available to a panel as it is to the member state. In this circum-
stance, the member state has little informational advantage over the panel,
while the panel still has the advantage of being unbiased. Thus, the case
for deference would be considerably weaker if the AB were to use this eco-
nomic measure rule instead of the existing multi-factor test.
This article now considers the normative case for alternative levels of
review. Because discussion of the applicable standard of review is necessa-
rily somewhat case specific, what follows is an attempt to provide some
useful guidelines for determining the standard of review. In a specific case
the general conclusions presented here can be combined with more
detailed analysis of the particulars of that case.
A. De Novo Review (or Close to it)
1. The Special Case of Questions of Law
The case for de novo review, or something close to it, is at its strongest
where sovereignty concerns are modest but neutrality is important.8 6 The
standard of review applicable to purely legal matters is the most obvious
example.
The WTO itself is the key source of expertise with respect to pure
questions of law.8 7 The task of deciding a question of law is really one of
interpreting the meaning of the text found in a covered agreement. 8 8
Though the legal question must arise within some factual context, the judi-
cial body need not understand any specific information about the enacting
country, nor does it need to know of issues unique to that country's priori-
83. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 20-21, WT/DS8/
AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages AB Report].
84. See id. (stating that given the case-by-case analysis that interpreting "like prod-
ucts" requires, panels can only apply their best judgment, and this will involve an ele-
ment of discretionary judgment).
85. Oesch, supra note 4, at 640.
86. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 17.
87. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 496 (stating that one of a panel's
basic activities is to make findings that are purely legal in nature).
88. See id. at 497 (observing that the AB must follow the customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention, which require
the treaty interpreter to seek out the ordinary meaning of the text).
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ties or concerns or how its markets function. 89
There are, however, important systemic issues relating to how the
WTO system will function, how the various obligations within the WTO
system affect one another, and the content of those obligations for every
member state. The characteristics of national authorities are not well
suited for addressing these pure questions of law.90 Panels and the AB,
however, are unbiased and have the appropriate expertise to resolve such
questions.9 1 As a normative matter, then, panels and the AB should decide
such questions of law on a de novo basis.9 2 The practice of the WTO's
judicial organs is consistent with this approach: purely legal determina-
tions receive de novo review.9 3
Panels and the AB can strike the appropriate balance between the sov-
ereignty of member states and the benefits from uniformity and neutrality
within a de novo standard of review. This is so because the substantive
rules, rather than the standard of review, primarily determine this crucial
balance. 94 In making its interpretation, a panel or the AB can take the
importance of sovereignty into account, which can influence the interpreta-
tion of the relevant legal rule. Without de novo review, or a similar type of
review, uniformity would be impossible and WTO obligations would mean
different things in different countries. 95 Not only would this create a con-
fusing legal framework, but it would also upset the balance of concessions
that member states made when negotiating the WTO agreements.
96
89. See id. (indicating that panels and the AB must reach their own conclusions
about legal conclusions regardless of the nation's application of law).
90. Id. at 498 (arguing that allowing individual WTO members to interpret WTO
law would lead to loss of uniformity that would undermine the rule-based system
because the obligations that members assume would differ from member to member).
91. See Oesch, supra note 4, at 643 (arguing that the "expertise argument" favors
panels and the AB regarding questions of law because these judicial organs have exper-
tise and institutional knowledge in WTO law and practice).
92. See OESCH, supra note 16, at 174 ("[Bloth panels and the Appellate Body have
constantly engaged in a de novo standard of review of WTO law.").
93. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 519-20 ("If the panel is reviewing
a purely legal issue, the panel conducts an original or de novo interpretation ....");
Holger Spamann, Standard of Review for World Trade Organization Panels in Trade Rem-
edy Cases: A Critical Analysis, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 509, 553 (2004) ("[T]he specialists for
WTO law are, after all, the Panels and especially the AB ....").
94. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 494-97 (noting that panels and the
AB must balance the power between WTO members and the WTO by making an "objec-
tive assessment" of the matter before them, which-in the case of legal interpretations of
WTO agreements-requires them to apply customary rules of interpretation of public
international law).
95. Id. at 498.
96. Id. (stating that the dispute settlement system seeks to preserve the WTO mem-
bers' balance of rights and obligations by providing for uniform interpretation of WTO
law, and that allowing members discretion to interpret WTO law would undermine the
core objectives of the rule-based system). It is worth noting at this point that the AB has
repeatedly stated that the standard of review applied should not be de novo. See, e.g.,
Appellate Body Report, United States- Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton
Yarn from Pakistan, ( 74, WT/DS192/AB/R (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter US-Cotton Yarn
AB Report] ("[Planels must examine whether the competent authority has evaluated all
relevant factors; they must assess whether the competent authority has examined all the
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These arguments in favor of de novo review of purely legal questions
are consistent with the AB's practice. In the EC-Hormones case, the AB
rejected the European Community's call for a deferential standard of review
with respect to legal rules.97 The AB explained that Article 3.2 of the DSU
instructs panels to apply customary rules of interpretation of public inter-
national law.98 The accepted sources for these customary rules are Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 99 Under these
provisions, the treaty interpreter is obliged to interpret the treaty "in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning" of the text. 100 Elaboration
of this obligation in the Vienna Convention leaves no room for interpreta-
tion based on the views of signatories as expressed after the treaty is
entered into force. As such, the rules of interpretation of customary law do
not afford panels or the AB discretion to defer to member states' views.
2. "All Relevant Factors"
Panels and the AB are frequently called upon to review an investiga-
tion by a domestic government. 10 1 An investigation is required, for exam-
ple, prior to the implementation of safeguards measures, anti-dumping
measures, countervailing duties, and SPS measures. When such a case
finds its way to a panel, the review of the measure includes two separate
elements. 10 2 The first is the form of the review by domestic authorities. 10 3
Did they take into account the right evidence? Did they provide appropri-
ate procedures? And so on. The second stage of the review concerns the
substantive question of whether the measure is justified on the merits. 10 4
pertinent facts and assessed whether an adequate explanation has been provided as to
how those facts support the determination; and they must also consider whether the
competent authority's explanation addresses fully the nature and complexities of the
data and responds to other plausible interpretations of the data. However, panels must
not conduct a de novo review of the evidence nor substitute their judgement [sic] for that
of the competent authority."). The reluctance to conduct a de novo review is under-
standable, but as this reluctance is stated in the cases it can be misleading. Though the
AB does not explicitly frame the standard of review in these terms, panels are to engage
in a review of purely legal questions and purely objective facts, as already discussed, in a
de novo fashion. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 496-98. In this context,
the AB's statements are better understood to mean that matters of judgment should not
be reviewed de novo. This interpretation is consistent with the normative claims made
in this article.
97. EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 9 118-119.
98. Id. 1 118.
99. Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 497; see Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
100. Vienna Convention art. 31(1).
101. See, e.g., EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 2 (calling upon the AB to
review the EC's assessment of the risk of importing meat treated with certain hormones
to determine whether the EC had complied with the requirement under the SPS
Agreement).
102. See Alexis Goh, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 2001 AusmL. INT'L LJ. 208,
230 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Though the required investigation differs somewhat across the various
WTO agreements, the first stage tends to include more formal and proce-
dural requirements and the second tends to focus more on substantive
questions. 10 5 The AB makes this distinction in US- Lamb, a case concern-
ing safeguards measures. 10 6 In that case the AB referred to the first ele-
ment as the "formal" review and considered whether domestic authorities
had examined "all relevant factors" as required under Article 4.2(a) of the
Safeguards Agreement. 10 7 The AB referred to the second element as the
"substantive" review, which deals with the defendant's reasons for its safe-
guard determination.10 8
Although the US- Lamb case is a safeguards case, the distinction
between formal and substantive review is more widely applicable. The
explicit obligation to review all relevant facts, for example, is present in the
Safeguards and AD Agreements and has been imported into other areas. 109
Even beyond the requirement to review all relevant facts, domestic govern-
ments are frequently required to give notice to other members, to provide
opportunities for other states to present evidence, and to explain their deci-
sions.11 0 These, and a host of other requirements present in various cov-
ered agreements, can also be categorized as "formal" requirements.
If one considers the balance between the expertise of member states
and the neutrality of panels and the AB, how should the WTO review these
formal matters? In practice, panels and the AB have adopted a stringent
standard of review on the question of whether all relevant facts have been
considered.'1 1 Is this consistent with the balancing of members' expertise
at the domestic level and the WTO's neutrality?
The distinction between formal and substantive review found in US-
Lamb, including its extension to other formal questions, is useful in
addressing this question because it identifies issues that raise important
concerns about interpretational bias but that can be resolved without sig-
nificant domestic expertise. 112 Consider again the "all relevant factors"
105. This distinction is imperfect, of course. In the SPS Agreement, for example, it is
often difficult to separate the "formal" requirement that a measure be based on a risk
assessment from the substantive question of how the applicable science is evaluated. See
SPS Agreement art. 3.3. Despite these problems, the distinction in the text is useful to
frame the standard of review inquiry.
106. Appellate Body Report, United States- Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh,
Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 103, WT/DS177/AB/R,
WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter US- Lamb AB Report].
107. Id. 'c1 103-104.
108. Id. ' 103. The first WTO case to discuss the standard of review to be applied
was US- Underwear, in which the panel concluded that there must be a review of "all
relevant facts" and an adequate explanation of how the "facts as a whole supported the
determination made." Panel Report, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-Made Fibre Underwear, ' 7.13, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter US-
Underwear Panel Report].
109. See, e.g., US- Underwear Panel Report, supra note 108, '1 1.1, 7.13. (addressing
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing).
110. See, e.g., SCM Agreement.
111. OESCH, supra note 16, at 119.
112. US-Lamb AB Report, supra note 106, 9 104.
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requirements. 113 Although it is perhaps imaginable that the relevance of a
particular fact can turn on details unique to the domestic context, this is
likely to be the exception rather than the rule. More commonly, relevance
will be clear to an observer, even if that observer is a WTO panel. 114 In
any event, if a particular fact is not relevant, the member state can nonethe-
less err on the side of caution and consider it. The other formal require-
ments-notice requirements, publication requirements, and so on-are
even less likely to involve domestic expertise. Thus in these areas, domes-
tic governments have at most a very modest informational advantage over a
panel or the AB.
These same issues, however, raise critical questions of bias. By omit-
ting certain relevant facts, a member state can make a decision appear
defensible and appropriate when, in fact, it is not. 115 Thus, a failure to
consider all facts both allows a member state to reach its preferred conclu-
sion-even when that conclusion is not justified once all relevant facts are
taken into account-and makes it more difficult for a panel, the AB, or
other states to understand the context in which a member state adopted a
trade measure. Similarly, a failure to publish information promptly, to
allow the submission of evidence, and to explain a state's actions can place
imports at a disadvantage, consequently achieving a protectionist
objective. 116
In light of the above, the adoption of a stringent standard when deal-
ing with formal review seems quite sensible. There is little loss of exper-
tise: the question of relevance is normally not something that differs from
country to country, and there is a significant concern of bias if states have
the discretion to make determinations about the relevance of particular
facts.
3. Objective Evidence
Beyond the question of whether all relevant facts have been consid-
ered, there can be disputes about the facts themselves-i.e., which alleged
facts are true and which are not. In many circumstances, the member state
will have a significant advantage in identifying relevant facts. In the case of
"raw facts," meaning facts that can be verified by the panel, there is a
strong case for de novo review. Indeed, the case of raw facts is an example
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See Safeguards Agreement art. 4.2(a) (providing a list of factors that the AB or
panel should consider, including "the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the
product concerned[,] ... the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports,
changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and
losses, and employment"). Given that the Safeguards Agreement provides a list of fac-
tors, the relevance of these factors will be clear within each context.
115. See, e.g., US-Cotton Yarn AB Report, supra note 96, 7.35.
116. See Safeguards Agreement art. 3.1 (requiring that an investigation by competent
authorities with respect to a safeguard measure include "reasonable public notice to all
interested parties ... or other appropriate means in which ... interested parties could
present evidence and their views" and requiring authorities to "publish a report setting
forth their findings and reasoned conclusions[,]" which suggests that not following
these requirements would result in protectionism).
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of a more general category of evidence that panels and the AB must review.
If an issue is to be determined based on objective and verifiable criteria or
evidence, there is a stronger case to be made for a fulsome review by a
panel or the AB.
For much of the evidence used in disputes, this point is sufficiently
clear that in practice the issue does not even arise. For example, there is no
dispute that a panel should examine the pattern of imports in a safeguards
case to determine if those imports have increased or decreased. 117 If the
available data shows that imports have risen, a panel will not accept claims
from the defendant that they have fallen. Moreover, the question of how to
determine whether imports have fallen is one for which panels or the AB
show little deference. 118
The most obvious category of objective evidence is economic data.
There can, of course, be questions of how the data was collected and
whether or not it is reliable; but once a source of data is agreed upon,
panels and the AB should, and do, engage in a high level of review. 119
Notice that here we are discussing only the evaluation of existing and
accepted data. Questions of how data should be collected or how reliable
it is are less objective, and domestic governments may have expertise in
these areas.120 For example, local conditions such as the frequency of false
reporting and the portion of the local economy included in economic sta-
tistics can affect data collection. 121 There may also be disagreements
about alternative sources of data with some observers (or member states)
favoring one source and others favoring another. Here, domestic govern-
ments are likely to have greater expertise than a panel or the AB in evaluat-
ing the available alternatives.
For these reasons, the questions of how data is collected and which
data is used are less objective than the simple reading of the data once it is
accepted. As such, the former questions should be reviewed less strin-
gently than the latter. This approach is broadly consistent with existing
practice at the WTO. In US- Combed Cotton Yarn, for example, the panel
stated that "[i]t is not for panels to prescribe precise methodologies for
information gathering and verification. In our view, the US methods used
in this proceeding are not unjustifiable, even though we recognize that
117. See id. arts. 2.1, 4.2(a).
118. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Argentina- Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear, 11 129-131, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina-Foot-
wear AB Report] (stating the stringent requirement that the increase in imports must be
"recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantita-
tively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause 'serious injury"').
119. OESCH, supra note 16, at 120.
120. See AD Agreement art. 17.6(i).
121. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL MERCHANDISE TRADE STA-
TISTICS COMPILERS MANUA at 43-45, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/87, U.N. Sales No.
E.02.XVII.17 (2004), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/
seriesf_87e.pdf (providing suggestions for increasing data quality control).
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there may be other approaches."1 22 Notice how deferential the language is
here: there is no indication that the United States must demonstrate that its
method is the best available. It is sufficient that the method is "not unjusti-
fiable" or, as stated in the same paragraph of the ruling, the party disput-
ing the data must show that it is "inherently untrustworthy. ' 12 3
The prior subsection addressed the question of how to review whether
the domestic authorities have examined all relevant factors in making a
determination. The argument for a stringent review in such cases relies on
the fact that the question of relevance is fairly objective, meaning that there
is little local expertise involved. 124
For similar reasons, it makes sense for panels or the AB to also apply a
stringent standard of review to most issues of transparency and most pro-
cedural requirements. There is little to be gained from transnational diver-
sity with respect to these issues, and it is relatively easy for a panel or the
AB to determine what is or is not being done by a member state. 125
Other categories of questions surely exist, but the point should be
clear: objective evidence for which there is little domestic expertise and on
which there will normally be broad agreement should be subject to a high
level of review.
B. Intermediate Review: Evidence Involving Judgment and Discretion
It is often remarked that the AB has taken a more deferential position
toward the review of factual questions.12 6 The previous discussion demon-
strates that this statement is somewhat overstated-at least some factual
questions are subject to very stringent review. 12 7 Nevertheless, it is true
that many questions of fact involve the application of judgment and discre-
tion and that this counsels for a more deferential approach. Broadly speak-
ing, the AB has applied a less stringent standard of review in such cases. 128
To say anything more precise requires examination of individual clauses
within the covered agreements. 129 The discussion that follows provides a
sketch of when panels and the AB apply deference.
Many of the most interesting problems of WTO dispute resolution
require a review of the application of judgment and discretion by a member
state.13 0 Here the evidence is not simply a matter of objective fact, but
122. Panel Report, United States- Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton
Yarn from Pakistan, 1 7.97, WT/DS192/R (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter US- Cotton Yarn
Panel Report].
123. Id.
124. See US-Lamb AB Report, supra note 106, 11 103-106.
125. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 12.
126. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 508 (stating that panels generally
accept a national authority's establishment of the facts).
127. See supra Part IV.A.3.
128. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 508.
129. Even an examination of individual covered agreements is not sufficient because
the standard of review that has been applied differs from one agreement and one clause
to another. Id. at 503.
130. Id. at 495.
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rather one of judgment or political assessment. Given the information
available to states, there may be more than one plausible conclusion. The
question is to what extent should a panel or the AB either substitute its
own preferred conclusion or investigate whether the member state's infer-
ence is reasonable?
Many examples of this kind of review are present in WTO jurispru-
dence. 1 3 ' To pick just one, consider the Argentina- Footwear case. 13 2 The
AB decision in that case included the following language, referring to the
standard of review adopted by the panel in examining Argentina's safe-
guards investigation:
[Wlith respect to its application of the standard of review, we do not believe
that the Panel conducted a de novo review of the evidence, or that it substi-
tuted its analysis and judgment for that of the Argentine authorities. Rather,
the Panel examined whether, as required by Article 4 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, the Argentine authorities had considered all the relevant facts
and had adequately explained how the facts supported the determinations
that were made. Indeed, far from departing from its responsibility, in our
view, the Panel was simply fulfilling its responsibility under Article 11 of the
DSU in taking the approach it did. To determine whether the safeguard
investigation and the resulting safeguard measure applied by Argentina were
consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel was
obliged, by the very terms of Article 4, to assess whether the Argentine
authorities had examined all the relevant facts and had provided a reasoned
explanation of how the facts supported their determination. 133
The first portion of the inquiry asks whether Argentina had consid-
ered all relevant facts. 134 As already discussed, the appropriate review here
would be quite stringent. There is no reason to believe that Argentina had
special knowledge about what facts are relevant and, in any event, it is
critical that the panel and the AB have a comprehensive view of the availa-
ble facts.
The second portion of the inquiry concerns whether Argentine author-
ities "had adequately explained how the facts supported the determina-
tions that were made."'13 5 The language suggests a limited inquiry: an
explanation is required and, furthermore, not just any explanation will
do.136 The explanation must be "adequate."' 37 The Argentine authorities
had significant but not unlimited discretion. The panel is not to demand
its own preferred explanation but must be satisfied with one that is merely
"adequate." This relationship between the specific facts of the case and
131. See, e.g., EC- Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 1 15 (discussing the standard
of review as a balance of "jurisdictional competencies" both retained by member states
and conceded to the WTO).
132. See generally Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 118.
133. Id. 91 121.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See US-Cotton Yarn AB Report, supra note 96, 91 74 (stating that panels must
"consider whether the competent authority's explanation addresses fully the nature and
complexities of the data and responds to other plausible interpretations of the data").
137. Id.; see Argentina-Footwear AB Report, supra note 118, 91 121.
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Argentina's decision cannot be described as a question of objective fact. It
involves both the subjective evaluation of the facts (e.g., determining if
there was injury or a threat of injury) and judgment about the appropriate
form of response (e.g., the form of the safeguard measure). 138
Some aspects of this second inquiry are fairly objective (e.g., the
increase in imports), while others are more subjective (e.g., whether the
increase was sudden or whether it caused the injury).139 The Argentine
authorities, therefore, must assess the realities of the situation in Argentina
and exercise their judgment. They are better positioned to consider the
specifics of the situation than is a panel or the AB. 140 The latter are unfa-
miliar with the Argentine economic and social context; they have much less
time to study the impact of an increase in imports, and they are poorly
positioned to evaluate the extent to which safeguards are necessary to pre-
vent or remedy serious injury. 14 1
The tension between neutrality and expertise is most acute in cases
involving national authorities' significant exercise of judgment. 142 How
should a panel or the AB review these decisions? Domestic conditions are
important, and domestic authorities are much better at evaluating those
conditions. Similarly, selecting methodology and drawing inferences
requires expertise, and domestic authorities are more likely to have such
expertise given their advantage in terms of time, resources, and contextual
knowledge.
Complete deference to Argentina, however, does not seem justified.
There is a great risk of bias because the protectionist tendencies of domes-
tic governments remain. 143 Furthermore, the ability of the panels and the
AB to review these decisions, although weaker than when reviewing objec-
tive evidence, remains significant. A panel or the AB can still competently
review non-objective aspects of the inquiry, even if local conditions are
138, The requirement of an adequate explanation is not unique to the Argentina-
Footwear case. It was first established in the United States- Underwear case, and has
been repeated in several places since. See US- Underwear Panel Report, supra note 108;
see, e.g., US- Lamb AB Report, supra note 106, 7 141; Panel Report, Argentina- Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches, 7.102, WT/DS238/R (Feb. 14,
2003); Panel Report, Korea- Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy
Products, l 7.30, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999); Panel Report, Thailand-Anti-Dumping
Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland,
c 7.256, WT/DS122/R (Sept. 28, 2000); Panel Report, United States-Definitive Safe-
guard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea,
7.194, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29, 2001); Panel Report, United States-Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, 8.5, WT/DS166/
R (July 31, 2000); Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, 7.27, WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997); US-Cotton Yarn Panel
Report, supra note 122, 7.29 (quoting US- Underwear Panel Report, supra note 108,
7.13).
139. Safeguards Agreement art. 4 (describing the application of safeguard measures).
140. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 501-03, 507-10.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 507-10.
143. Guzman, supra note 47, at 15.
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relevant. 144
Part of the answer here is that these questions of review are simply a
microcosm of the argument advanced in this article. If the review concerns
legal questions of objective fact, a higher standard can be applied, and if
the questions are more subjective, a lower standard should be used. But
there remain questions in which objective and subjective matters are not
separable. These cases call for an intermediate review. Domestic authori-
ties must be permitted some discretion in applying their expertise and
judgment, but there must nonetheless be some review to guard against
abuses. This is an unavoidably imperfect process. Any discretion given to
the state increases the potential for protectionist abuses, while any judicial
review of subjective judgments raises the risk of error. 145
The task is to balance these alternative evils. In the most difficult
cases, a moderate review is best suited to this task. Where neutrality is
more critical and national expertise less so, there should be more review,
and where the importance of these factors is reversed, there should be less.
The next question is to consider how these normative considerations
compare to what panels and the AB have actually done. A thorough exami-
nation of this question would take up more space than is available here,
but it is fair to say that the practice to date has largely been consistent with
the approach suggested here. 146
For example, in the United States- Cotton Yarn case, the AB stated that
the panel is not to prescribe a precise methodology for the collection and
verification of data. 147 The panel allowed the United States the discretion
to use its preferred method even though others were available. 148 One
could imagine a panel inquiring as to the "best" methodology for the task
at hand and requiring that the United States adopt that approach. Choos-
ing instead to defer to American authorities' decisions is consistent with
the above argument that the domestic government will generally have
greater expertise with respect to these activities. To say that a panel is not
to prescribe a precise methodology, however, does not rule out a panel's
objection if the methods the domestic government used are unreasona-
ble.149 In other words, an intermediate standard is applied.
144. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 504-05 (noting that a panel must
often confront mixed questions of law and fact which require it to balance objective and
subjective factors).
145. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 47, at 20-21 ("WTO review is valuable.., as a
mechanism to discourage states from engaging in conduct prohibited by WTO rules."
Yet, "WTO dispute resolution bodies ... are more likely to err in their evaluation of the
level of risk that a state's population is prepared to accept.").
146. See generally Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15 (exploring how panels and
the AB have approached the review of legal and factual determinations, as well as differ-
ent national measures).
147. US- Cotton Yarn Panel Report, supra note 122, 9 7.97.
148. Id.
149. Id. (suggesting that the panel would have objected if the methods of the United
States were unjustifiable).
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C. Deferential Review: Science, Risk, and Risk Assessment
Finally, there is a class of cases that involve such a large degree of
judgment and contextual expertise that review by a panel or the AB should
be quite modest-perhaps even completely deferential. 150 This conclusion
involves a judgment that the risk of protectionist abuse is modest and that
the potential harms from a review of domestic decisions is significant.15 1
As such, it applies only in exceptional areas such as decisions about
domestic risk preferences and evaluations of science. 15 2
The SPS Agreement requires that SPS measures (assuming they are not
justified by an international standard as provided in Article 3) be based on
scientific principles. 15 3 Article 5 of the Agreement requires, for this pur-
pose, a risk assessment. 154 So, how should a panel or the AB review the
decision to enact an SPS measure?
We return to the foundational claim: we must balance the advantages
that the domestic government has against concerns about sham use of the
SPS Agreement to achieve protectionism. The decisions involved in the
implementation of an SPS measure can be disaggregated in a way that iden-
tifies some as deserving a high level of review and others as deserving
extreme deference.
Consider first the evaluation of scientific data. Some data is objective
and should be subject to review that is de novo or close to it. 15 5 Whether
an international standard exists, for example, should be reviewed de novo
as there is no meaningful concern that the panel will err. 15 6 Similarly, the
panel or the AB is certainly in a position to verify that the existing studies
the member state relied upon in fact exist and that the content of those
studies-meaning the objective observable content, as distinct from the
interpretation of the results-is as claimed. In this very narrow sense, there
should be de novo review of scientific data.
The question of whether authorities have collected and considered all
relevant evidence is much like the prior discussion of whether all evidence
is considered-it is a fairly objective issue. With science, there may be a
larger margin of uncertainty concerning what counts as evidence, 157 but
otherwise it is quite similar. There should, therefore, be a high level of
review on the question of whether all relevant evidence has been
considered.
The important task of evaluating the data and drawing conclusions is
more difficult because here there is significant scope for judgment and
150. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 47, at 17-18 (stating that cases involving health
and safety call for a more deferential review because "domestic governments are better at
identifying the wishes of their citizens, including attitudes toward risk, and they are
better at evaluating science").
151. Id. at 21-24.
152. See id. at 20.
153. SPS Agreement art. 2.2.
154. Id. art. 5.1.
155. OEscH, supra note 16, at 123.
156. See id. at 122-24.
157. Id.
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application of expertise. For example, if there is no consensus of scientific
opinion, should a panel or the AB require that the member state adopt the
majority view or simply a credible view? In answering, one must balance at
least two priorities. The first is regulatory sovereignty-states should
retain the autonomy to select the level of health risk they are prepared to
tolerate. 158 Domestic control over such decisions is important for any
number of reasons, including that the willingness of individuals to accept
risk may vary from state to state, as might confidence in the applicable
scientific evidence. 159 More importantly, this decision is widely (and
appropriately) accepted as one that is best left in the hands of domestic
authorities.' 60 The second priority is restricting the scope for protection-
ism. Full domestic control over health and safety decisions necessarily
gives the states the ability to use those measures for protectionist pur-
poses. 16 1 The tension between these priorities leaves little middle
ground. 162 The WTO regime must, in the end, either leave policy deci-
sions in the hands of individual states or engage in a review of those deci-
sions, making judgments about the relevant scientific evidence and the risk
tolerance of states.' 6 3
Comparing the risks on each side, it is clear that here it is best to err
on the side of deference to member states. WTO panels and the AB are
quite ill equipped to engage in review of scientific judgments by member
states.16 4 Though under the rules of the DSU the panels and the AB are
permitted to appoint their own experts to assist them in their delibera-
tions,16 5 this is a poor substitute for the skill and time required to reach
reliable conclusions about the relevant science.
The potential for a panel or the AB to reach erroneous conclusions is
magnified by the fact that, even after one has reached some judgment
about the reliability of the relevant science, one must form a judgment
158. See Howse, supra note 79, at 2342.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 2354-56 (arguing that it is difficult for members to regulate themselves
so that their protective measures are not more trade-restrictive than required).
162. Id. at 2334 ("Judgments by the WTO dispute settlement organs about what con-
stitutes de minimus scientific evidence, however, would themselves entail substantive
judgments of value concerning the regulatory process, begging the question of which
regulatory values should determine the 'minimum."'); Sykes, supra note 71, at 355
("WTO law must then choose between an interpretation of scientific evidence require-
ments that essentially eviscerates them and defers to national judgments about 'science,'
or an interpretation that gives them real bite at the expense of the capacity of national
regulators to choose the level of risk that they will tolerate.").
163. See Theofanis Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the
WTO: A Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 8
N.Y.U. ENvrL. LJ. 622, 622-23 (2000) (observing that the WTO has now "been given
the binding authority to adjudicate science-based international trade disputes" and not-
ing the new procedural and substantive issues that result).
164. Id. at 635 (arguing that WTO panels are not qualified to judge the plausibility of
competing parties' scientific views because they are composed of laypersons lacking in
scientific knowledge).
165. DSU art. 13.
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about the risk preferences of the relevant state. 166 Is the member state
willing to accept some increase in, say, the risk to human health in
exchange for a product that is lower cost? This question arose in both the
EC-Hormones and the EC-GMOs cases. 167 The risk tolerance of a state
is, of course, the product of complex political forces, and it is hard to imag-
ine a panel reaching a reliable conclusion on the subject.168 Here, the
domestic government has much greater expertise, and so the case for defer-
ence is stronger.
Turning to what is actually done in WTO cases, the AB appears to
have established a higher standard of review than the above discussion rec-
ommends. 169 In reviewing the scientific evidence used in risk assessments
under the SPS Agreement, the AB has indicated that panels are to evaluate
the scientific evidence with little deference to the views of the relevant
domestic government. 170 For example, in the Japan-Apples case, the AB
stated that "Japan's submission that the Panel was obliged to favour Japan's
approach to risk and scientific evidence over the views of the experts con-
flicts with the Appellate Body's articulation of the standard of 'objective
assessment of the facts." 171 A similar attitude was evidenced in the Aus-
tralia- Salmon case, where the AB stated that panels "are not required to
accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as
do the parties."'1 72 Matthias Oesch goes so far as to conclude that the
"panels' approach has overall amounted to a de novo standard of review
with respect to the relevance and adequacy of scientific data."'1 73 This con-
clusion may overstate the extent to which panels review states' scientific
judgments, in particular because states are entitled to use minority scien-
tific views in forming their judgments. 174 The lack of deference to state
decisions must be viewed within the context of a set of substantive rules
that give states considerable flexibility in how they evaluate science. Nev-
ertheless, it is accurate to say that the evaluation of science is subject to a
significant review.
In contrast to the treatment of scientific evidence, panels are to give
considerable deference to "risk management."' 75 "The determination of
166. Howse, supra note 79, at 2342 ("[S]cience cannot tell us just how conservative or
protective it is reasonable to be in the presence of a given level of error or uncertainty in
a scientific assessment of risk. In a democracy, this will depend on citizens' preferences
about risk.").
167. See generally EC- Hormones AB Report, supra note 9; Panel Report, European
Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/
DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006).
168. See OEScH, supra note 16, at 141-42.
169. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
171. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
165, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003).
172. Appellate Body Report, Australia- Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 9[
267, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australia- Salmon AB Report].
173. OESCH, supra note 16, at 123.
174. EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 9 194.
175. See Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 172, 198-200; Panel Report,
European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Com-
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the appropriate level of protection ... is a prerogative of the Member con-
cerned and not of a panel or of the Appellate Body."176 The justification
for deference in this context is that risk management is thought to be non-
scientific. 177 This is consistent with this article's general argument in the
sense that risk management is something that requires a great deal of local
knowledge. Domestic governments are therefore better equipped to carry
it out than are panels or the AB.
Therefore, the existing rules governing the standard of review in SPS
cases leave judgments about risk tolerance to the states while allowing
WTO adjudicatory bodies to review the merits of the relevant science.
There are at least two problems with this approach. First, with respect to
evaluating science, domestic authorities have a significant advantage over
the WTO's adjudicatory organs. 178 Scientific evidence is often disputed
within the scientific community, making it necessary for policymakers to
judge the relative merits of competing scientific claims. This is difficult
enough for government officials working with the advantage of time,
resources, and the freedom to access expertise in any suitable way. For a
panel or the AB the task is much more difficult. Panelists and AB members
are not chosen for their scientific expertise and they face time constraints
as well as limited resources, staffing, and budgets for their inquiry. 179
There is no realistic prospect that they could carry out a thorough and
informed evaluation of scientific evidence. 180
Second, a state's evaluation of science is itself influenced by domestic
priorities and cultural values.181 The use and evaluation of scientific evi-
dence includes a significant subjective component. 18 2 States may, in good
faith, disagree on the meaning and importance of scientific evidence, and
these differences may reflect country-specific attitudes toward scientific
proof and inference. 18 3 Understandably, domestic governments have a
better sense of local attitudes toward science than does a panel or the AB.
The difference between the approach laid out in AB jurisprudence and
the approach advocated in this article turns primarily on the relative abili-
ties of states and panels to evaluate scientific evidence. If panels could
objectively and accurately evaluate that evidence, and if that evaluation
plaint by Canada, '1 8.100, 8.163, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones, Complaint by Canada] (defining "risk management"). But see EC- Hormones
AB Report, supra note 9, 91 181 (rejecting the panel's distinction between "risk assess-
ment" and "risk management").
176. Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 172, 91 199.
177. EC-Hormones, Complaint by Canada, supra note 175, 919i 8.100, 8.163.
178. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 20-23, 38.
179. Id. at 23; see DSU art. 8; see also Christoforou, supra note 163, at 647-48.
180. It is true that panels and the AB can consult with experts to assist them in their
decision. DSU art. 13. Although this improves their capacity to handle scientific issues,
it is far from a substitute for the capabilities of domestic authorities.
181. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 22; see also Steve Charnovitz, Improving the Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLEN-
NIUM 171, 171-72 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 1999).
182. See Charnovitz, supra note 181, at 171-72; Guzman, supra note 47, at 21-24.
183. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 21.
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required no particularized knowledge regarding the priorities and attitudes
of individual states, then the existing approach would be defensible. As
already discussed, however, this is an unrealistic picture of how disputes
about science play out. Because domestic governments have a greater abil-
ity to evaluate scientific evidence than do panels, the review of government
decisions should be quite deferential.
There is, of course, a risk that a state will use the SPS rules as a justifi-
cation for protectionism, even if it has no legitimate concern about health
and safety. 18 4 This concern, however, does not undermine the argument
for deference. First, given that risk management is left to the states and is
subject to quite deferential review, a stringent review of the science used
adds no more than modest discipline to the system. Certainly, as long as
there is agreement that a product poses some degree of risk, a state can
always opt for an exposure to that risk that is sufficiently low as to achieve
their trade objectives. 185 If there is no scientific consensus regarding the
presence of absence of risk, then the question becomes one of whether a
product is sufficiently safe. 1 8 6 This discussion must necessarily include
consideration of a state's willingness to expose itself to an uncertain risk-
which returns the analysis to the risk management question. 187 To date,
the AB has allowed panels to review this secondary risk management ques-
tion (exposure to uncertain risks), but it is not clear why secondary risk
management is treated differently from the primary risk management deci-
sion (exposure to known risks). 188
Second, although the potential for abuse exists, it is no greater under
the SPS Agreement than it is in other trade disputes. What has changed is
the competence of panels and the AB.18 9 Because these bodies are poorly
situated to assess science or risk tolerance, the balance between domestic
expertise and WTO neutrality tilts further toward domestic expertise. 190
With respect to both the evaluation of science and the risk tolerance of
member states, it is sensible to leave almost complete discretion with
184. See id. at 15; see also SPS Agreement art. 5.8.
185. See SPS Agreement Annex A cl 5 (defining the appropriate level of protection as
that "deemed appropriate by the Member").
186. See id. art. 3.3 n.2.
187. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
188. See Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 172, 11 198-200; EC-Hormones,
Complaint by Canada, supra note 175, IN9 8.100, 8.163 (defining "risk management").
But see EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, '1 181 (rejecting the panel's distinction
between "risk assessment" and "risk management").
189. See Christoforou, supra note 163, at 635 (noting that WTO panels lack scientific
knowledge and thus are not qualified to judge competing parties' scientific views).
190. See Guzman, supra note 47, at 17-18, 23 (arguing that panels and the AB are
poorly equipped to evaluate scientific evidence, while domestic governments are better
at evaluating science). It is also worth noting that deference may sometimes be required
to preserve the legitimacy and stability of the dispute settlement system. When a review
at the WTO impinges too much on traditional areas of sovereignty, even if judgments
require only limited domestic expertise, it may be appropriate to defer to national
authorities. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 493-94 (noting that panels
and the AB are criticized for their level of scrutiny of national measures and that they are
accused of usurping WTO members' powers).
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domestic authorities. To do otherwise is to ask panels and the AB to form
judgments in areas in which they are supremely unqualified.
Finally, the analysis must consider those requirements within the SPS
Agreement that do not require judgments about science. 19 1 Consider, in
particular, the set of requirements that encourage transparency. 192 These
include an obligation to publish regulations promptly,1 9 3 to give producers
time to adjust before a measure comes into effect, 19 4 to establish "enquiry
points" to answer questions relating to the measure, 19 5 and to give other
member states an opportunity to comment and discuss the proposed mea-
sure. 19 6 Additionally, the risk assessment itself must be transparent.
19 7
Members must answer all reasonable questions regarding the procedures
used in the assessment, including the factors taken into consideration and
the "determination of the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection."' 9 8 The requirements impose a significant degree of openness
on the adoption of an SPS measure and should be subject to a high level of
review. These are objective questions of fact and a panel or the AB can
review them accurately. The enforcement of transparency requirements
also serves to guard against protectionist abuse as it makes it more difficult
for a member state to assert a pretextual justification. 19 9 "Measures that
comply with the procedural requirements of the SPS Agreement but that
look to the rest of the world like protectionist measures will be more costly
to adopt because affected states will put political pressure on the enacting
member." 200
D. The Special Case of the AD Agreement
As previously mentioned, the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides its
own, deferential standard of review. In particular, the panel is to accept a
member state's views as long as it determines that the state's establishment
of the facts was "proper" and that the state's evaluation of those facts was
"unbiased and objective."' 20 1 This deferential standard of review provides
states with considerable leeway in establishing the facts necessary to pur-
sue their preferred policies. Notice that the standard of review focuses
entirely on process rather than substance. 20 2 A panel can refuse to accept
191. See, e.g., SPS Agreement arts. 7-9.
192. Id. art. 7.
193. Id. art. 7, Annex B 1 1.
194. Id. Annex B 2.
195. Id. Annex B 3.
196. Id. Annex B 5(d).
197. Id. art. 5.1, Annex B 9 3(c).
198. Id. Annex B 1 3(c).
199. Guzman, supra note 47, at 35.
200. Id.; see Howse, supra note 79, at 2330 (arguing that the SPS "provisions can be,
and should be, understood not as usurping legitimate democratic choices for stricter
regulations, but as enhancing the quality of rational democratic deliberation about risk
and its control").
201. AD Agreement art. 17.6(i).
202. Croley & Jackson, supra note 23, at 208 n.65 (noting that Article 17.6 gives the
panels an obligation to evaluate the fact-finding process).
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a member state's view of the facts only if it finds the process was defec-
tive-either because the establishment of facts was not proper or because
the evaluation of the facts was biased. 203 Although states must avoid pro-
viding biased evidence, there is little to prevent them from shading the facts
to suit their needs.
With respect to legal interpretations, the panel "shall interpret the rela-
tive provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law."'20 4 This requirement refers to
the interpretive strategies set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. 205 If the panel finds that "a relevant provi-
sion of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation,
the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations. '20 6 In
other words, if a member state can justify its measure under a permissible
interpretation- even if other permissible interpretations exist-then the
panel must conclude that the measure is consistent with the AD
Agreement.207
The implication of the above standard of review for legal questions is
to greatly expand the permissible set of anti-dumping measures that a state
may undertake. Different states can, for example, rely on mutually incon-
sistent interpretations of the agreement to justify their respective mea-
sures.20 8 As long as both interpretations are "permissible," a panel or the
AB will find both interpretations sufficient to permit the measures. 20 9
The significant deference to the member states enacting an anti-dump-
ing measure is arguably consistent with the substantive provisions in the
AD Agreement. These provisions require that the enacting state carry out
an investigation prior to adopting anti-dumping measures, 210 provide
details about the gathering of evidence and notice to interested parties, 211
and so on. 212 Absent Article 17.6, however, it is easy to imagine a panel's
more substantive review of both facts and law.2 13 The fact that national
authorities have conducted an investigation does not imply that the investi-
203. AD Agreement art. 17.6.
204. Id. art. 17.6(ii).
205. Hot-Rolled Steel AB Report, supra note 34, 1 57; Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden
Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Deci-
sions, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 109, 119-20 (2002); see Vienna Convention arts.
31-32.
206. AD Agreement art. 17.6(ii).
207. See id.
208. See Croley &Jackson, supra note 23, at 200 (arguing that if the national interpre-
tation is within the set of "permissible" interpretations, "the panel must defer to the
interpretation given the provision by the national government").
209. Id.
210. See AD Agreement art. 5.
211. Id. art. 6.
212. See Ehlermann & Lockhart, supra note 15, at 507 (arguing that the AD Agree-
ment "gives a pre-eminent position to the national investigation").
213. Id. ("The role of the panel is ... confined to reviewing the investigation and
determination that has been carried out at the national level.").
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gation reached the correct conclusion or that it properly interpreted rele-
vant WTO law.
Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement reflects the decision of the member
states that panels should refrain from aggressive review of anti-dumping
measures. 214 The approach that the AD Agreement requires is inconsistent
with this article's normative proposal. It is perhaps telling that the drafters
of the AD Agreement felt the need to include a specific standard of review
provision.215 Without that provision, it is difficult to see how a panel
would have concluded that such a deferential review of AD measures
would be appropriate.
Conclusion
To date the WTO has failed to provide clear and predictable principles
to govern the standard of review. As a result, member states and panels are
unable to accurately predict the outcome of individual cases. This article
offers a simple yet principled approach to the standard of review problem
that can be applied to the full range of disputes at the WTO. At the heart of
this approach is a recognition that domestic governments and panels have
distinct strengths and weaknesses. States have information about domestic
priorities and preferences, allowing them to adjust domestic policy to serve
their country's needs. Because they are responsive to domestic needs, how-
ever, member states cannot be relied upon to evaluate either facts or legal
rules in an unbiased fashion.
Panels and the AB, however, are poorly positioned to assess domestic
preferences and priorities. They are not designed to perform this role, and
they lack the resources and skills to carry it out. The key asset of the
panels and the AB is their neutrality. Unlike member states, they have no
interest in serving the interests of one member over those of another.
Panels and the AB are best suited for the task of providing unbiased inter-
pretations of WTO agreements where required.216
This simple tradeoff between expertise and neutrality can and should
guide the determination of appropriate standards of review. On the one
hand, where it is possible to evaluate relevant facts using objective criteria
and without reference to domestic priorities, panels and the AB should
apply a high level of review. Where, on the other hand, there is little risk of
bias and a decision requires a great deal of local knowledge, there should
be deference to domestic policymakers. In the large number of cases that
lie between these two extremes, the standard of review should reflect the
relative importance of neutrality and domestic expertise.
Existing WTO jurisprudence is generally in line with the proposed
approach. 217 The one area where actual practice diverges significantly
from the normative discussion is in the area of risk and risk assessment.
214. See AD Agreement art. 17.6.
215. Id.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra Part IV.
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This area is one in which domestic judgments and priorities, along with
the other advantages domestic governments have in evaluating science,
make domestic governments much better decisionmakers than panels.
Although there are concerns about neutrality in this area, the importance
of localized expertise outweighs those concerns. For these reasons, the
appropriate standard of review in both risk management and risk assess-
ment is one of great deference. To date the WTO has shown deference in
the area of risk management, but not in the area of risk assessment. 218
This may reflect a difference in attitudes about the extent to which scien-
tific judgments can be reviewed objectively by a panel without detailed
knowledge of local attitudes toward science.
Though the difference between the proposal advanced in this article
and actual practice is significant, the larger lesson is that the standard of
review has been appropriately determined in most areas. What is missing
is an explicit embrace of the tradeoff between neutrality and expertise. If
the AB were to adopt this as a general approach to the problem, everyone
involved would have a much easier time anticipating the standard of review
that would be applied in a given case, and panels and the AB would have
clear guidelines to determine the appropriate standard when faced with
new situations.
218. See Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 172, c[cl 198-200; EC-Hormones,
Complaint by Canada, supra note 175, 911 8.100, 8.163 (defining "risk management").
But see EC- Hormones AB Report, supra note 9, 181 (rejecting the panel's distinction
between "risk assessment" and "risk management").
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